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This text is dedicated and intended to my children, their children, and to all present and future human children.

DDD: Meaning and context

DDD is an acronym for « Democracy by Digital Delegation » which could also be called "Democracy by Continuous Digital Delegation", or simply "Democracy 2.0".

As the name implies, this is a proposal for the development and renewal of the democratic representation model.

This democratic improvement is digital, in the sense that information and telecommunication technologies play an important and innovative role.

It operates primarily through a delegation system that differs from the current electoral systems.

And this delegation is continuous, continually updated, while current systems are typically cyclical.

The DDD model is part of a larger study, the "M3M model". The M3M model combines a critical review of the current models (collectivist model, competitive model, democracy, particracy, work, business) with a new model and a societal project. The text describing the M3M model is organized in three parts. The first part is the criticism of obsolete models of society. The second part is a deliberate choice of simple values ​​on which should be built a better and new model, intended to be translated into a kind of specifications. The third part describes the components chosen to implement the previously established specifications.


This text is organized in two parts. The first part summarizes the weaknesses of the western democracies, suggesting that these weaknesses might be treated or cured. The second part describes the main components of the DDD democratic model.


Weaknesses of Western democracies

In Europe, in America and throughout the world, the democratic model is sick: voters feel misunderstood, they no longer worry about exercising the right to vote, though hard-won by their predecessors. The political class and the elected officials, once invested with power, induce the distrust and suspicion of those who have chosen them. Whether or not these suspicions are justified, voters no longer feel correctly represented in the numerous and complex institutions engendered by the increasingly tortuous and contradictory machinery of democratic structures.

The old democratic principle, namely the dignified and balanced representation of the elector, has been lost somewhere in the successive improvements of history. It is time to take a critical look at it, and to build something else, keeping the vital force of the democratic principle, but incorporating new structures and means suitable for the biotope of contemporary man.

Many authors and journalists have highlighted the limits and weaknesses of the democratic machinery. Here are reported, without originality, the most significant ones, which will serve as contrasting base to the DDD proposals.

Strange success criteria for the elected representatives

Electoral campaigns involve candidates whose aim is to obtain a maximum number of votes. As a consequence, the elegance, the presence, the sense of distribution and the effectiveness of the media weigh more than the ambition or the clarity of the programs presented. These come down to well-chosen slogans, often developed by communication consultants whose performance will be paid not according to the quality of the program and the themes presented, but according to the votes obtained. As for the candidates themselves, the criteria of success mentioned - such as personality, media efficiency and others - will push forward and favour sympathetic and popular personalities, entertainment and communication people, such as journalists, actors, charismatic business men. These profiles cannot be systematically denied human qualities, ideals and management qualities. However, given the challenges faced by elected officials, it is clear that these profiles are not a priori the best-equipped to deal with these problems, compared to various specialists in the technical, political or scientific spheres. Alas, the latter rarely put their priorities in the techniques of electoral communications, or have no inclination for these exercises.

Democratic cycles are sources of dysfunction

In all democracies the same depressing cycles are observed in their naive repetition.

In electoral periods - mandates expiring and renewing - elected representatives in place do as their competitors eager to take their place. It is the period of promises in every direction, of the glorious results claimed by those who have exercised power, of the deplorable results reported by those who wish that those who have exercised it give way to it. During this election period, candidates are enthusiastically depicted by their troops, with disdain by their competitors, and objectivity gives way completely to the media circus. One of the consequences of these exercises is that the elected officials in this period no longer care to manage but rather present an optimal balance sheet enhanced with promises brought to the style of the day.

Then, during the exercise of the mandate, the elected representative is gradually forced to retreat, faced to too optimistic promises that he had to advance in order to obtain the votes. Inevitably, or at least in the vast majority of cases, the popularity of an elected official is gradually weaker than he had at the time of his campaign. And in fact the management of the problems is biased and unhealthy, since the distortions between promises and constraints in the field imply a management in delicate equilibrium. It is during the mandate that elected officials can draw more or less legitimately, and never announced, benefits from their power. It is the moment to return favours, to do the inventory of debits and credits between representatives and those who gave them their support, and to search for the best returns on electoral investment. If they are undeniably honest and devoted political staff - but how did they get there? - it should also be noted that others who are less scrupulous know how to take advantage of the money invested in election campaigns. The former want and can deal with problems in the interest of the citizen, but the latter want and can deal with the same problems without forgetting the interest of their party, their friends and themselves.

Moreover, democratic cycles often have as a corollary the alternation of men and parties in power. Most often the end of a mandate and the beginning of the next one involve the pausing of the programs slowly put in place by the predecessors, and the gradual taking of information from the successors. This results in long periods of wavering and management failure, either because programs can no longer be completed, or because they are not yet solidly supported by information or not fully constructed. In both cases, the possible management qualities of the predecessors and successors do not weigh heavily against the implacable logic of democratic cycles.

It is not in the interest of elected representatives to tackle the real problems

Why should an elected representative bravely tackle the most delicate problems he is being asked to tackle?

It has been shown that if the best solution to a problem involves unpopular measures, unlikely to retain or drain votes in the future, then an elected official has every interest not to treat it. It is better for him to take temporary, popular and, preferably, mediate measures, rather than addressing a problem at the source. Postulating hard decisions, conveying to others the delicate and unpopular need to treat them better is the most profitable political choice. This is a step in time: NIMTO (not in my term of office). The same logic exists for the fields of competence: NIMBY (not in my back yard). In other words, no politician wishes a thorny problem to falls within his sphere of competence.

Limits of particracy

Political parties allow individuals sharing similar opinions to group together and thereby gain more representative strength. It is a respectable principle in itself, and a rather natural prolongation of human nature.

However, particracy leads to various suspicious and reprehensible drifts. The individual voter often feels more inclined to a party's wing rather than to its globality, or even for an individual or group of individuals within that party. Moreover, parties are debatable fields of negotiation and effective distribution of power, where voters and their interests are not represented or defended in a transparent way. Finally, relations between political parties and financial powers are often compromising, opaque, and incite forms of compromise, even corruptions. Party funding mechanisms are often investigated, and it can be assumed that those not being investigated are simply those that are organized in a more discreet manner.

Citizen kept too far from power

Often forced to choose between parties and people he does not know and over whom he has no control, the citizen does not recognize himself in the choices he is led to produce, and therefore does not care. He thus loses confidence not only in the parties and elected officials holding power, but even and especially in the mode of democratic representation that is presented to him.

Non-specialization of elected representatives and leaders

It is a generic effect of the democratic mechanisms, but amplified by the particracy. Leadership positions, which always correspond to more or less broad areas of competence, are distributed between elected representatives either directly or indirectly through negotiations between ruling parties, and even more within them. But in the vast majority of cases, the leaders in place and part of their teams have no expertise, no special skills. Their electoral and political successes give them the right to practice in the most diverse fields: health, environment, education, finance, justice, international relations, etc. It is as if none of these fields require knowledge, as if the electoral competence was universally applicable and transposable.

At the same time, the voter who trusts a man or a party for certain fields of competence has to choose the same man, or the same and only party for all areas of competence. What should be the choice of whoever thinks that a party's budget program is vital, while its approach to education is deplorable?

Difficult representation of minorities

Minorities consider themselves as poorly represented in the great democratic states and in fact they often are. Large entities in population and economic power, such as Greece (towards the EU), Scotland (towards Great Britain), Great Britain (towards the EU), Catalonia (towards Spain), California (towards the USA) sees themselves as holders of badly or unrepresented identities, and wishes - and sometimes obtains - forms of secession, while this secession is a distressing prospect for many members of the super entity and for many members of the sub-entity. And of course in all parts of the world, smaller entities often experience much more dramatically equivalent situations.

Ethnic, religious or cultural minorities live with similar problems, even if they do not have a defined geographical anchorage. These entities exist and are often represented by groups of influence or pressure, but often find in the democratic machinery only ineffective representations, often perceived as unfair.

Moreover, each of us possesses a mixture of multiple identities, and it would be absurd to try to force a person to define himself by a single identity, or by a single party.

Existing democracies do not respect the identities of the minority groups they inhabit or the multiple identities of the individuals who make up these democracies.

When people say 'NO!' to the democracy

Beginning in 2016, the rejection of the democratic model was clearly manifested in major events in the planet’s political life.

In Britain, in June 2016, Britain's choice of the brexit expressed the disavowal of the European construction by one of its most important actors, widely opening the way to Euro-scepticism in each of its member states.

In the United States, in the Republican primaries, and more in the November 2016 presidential elections, the political class of the world's first power was slapped by a billionaire who was notoriously ignorant of politics and diplomatic matters. To the great democratic and republican figures, the elector preferred a narcissistic and megalomaniac clown to direct him on dangerous paths. One hundred days after the start of the presidential term, a record of unpopularity is beaten by this new champion of democracy.

In France, in May 2017, the presidential elections brought together four candidates, each one separately receiving more obstruction, protest, denigration than support. In the second round, the main messages express the 'need to block ...'. The president did not convince 25% of voters in the first round, and he begins his mandate with more opponents than supporters.

In these three cases, the themes of identity retrenchment, far from the humanist ideals supposed to feed the democratic processes, were the most widely claimed.

Besides that, in these three cases, the dominant message was a NO. No to the political class in general, not to the 'democratic' supranational (European) construction, not to the major players of political landscapes.

Finally, in all three cases, the weaknesses of the democracies mentioned above have been clearly emphasized and even demonstrated.


Citizen Manifesto

Here are indirectly stated the general principles of DDD. It is therefore both a response to the diseases described above, and a kind of specifications.


We, citizens and voters, aspire to a model of representation that is more democratic, closer, more flexible and more adapted to our time. In particular :

* We want to be able to direct our votes in different competence fields independently.

  • We want to be able to redirect our votes when we want to, and not when cycles allow and impose it to us. By this we do not want to be hostages to cycles of election promises followed by too frequent disavowals.
  • We want to escape to party logic, because parties are far away from us. We prefer to give voice to people or structures closer to us, possibly delegating our electoral weight to them if they do not have or aim at direct responsibilities.
  • We want to be able, according to our own individual skills - and in the corresponding field(s) of competence - to be able to become the electoral delegates of the people who would give us their trust.
  • We wish to benefit, in the exercise of our choice of representation, from the flexibility, the proximity and the interactivity of the web applications.


General principles of the DDD model

Answering to the citizen’s expectations listed in the manifesto above, in the DDD model, in contrast to the standard democratic model:* There should be no cycle in the democratic exercise: it is an ongoing process.

  • There should be voters, candidates, representatives, but no election event.
  • The parties, lobbies and pressure groups should be replaced by more numerous and more flexible structures.
  • Competence fields (CF) should defined and serve as well-segmented territories of democratic exercise of power.


Actors in the DDD model

The voter

As in the classic model, the citizen-voter defines choices through votes. However they are structured differently, they may be very simple or relatively complex, but the general democratic principle remains applicable: the elected representatives are ultimately designated by him, the elector, and his voter peers.

The candidate

Any elector may declare himself (herself) a candidate in a given competence field. If this is the case, it is his responsibility to publish his program, his own choices and convictions. He may receive an executive charge in a CF management college.

The elected representative

The candidate is likely to become a elected representative, receiving active responsibilities within a CF management college.

The delegate

Any elector may declare himself a delegate in a given CF. This means that other voters can trust him and align their votes on his own voting choices. This is one of the delegation mechanisms. The delegate does not necessarily have to publish a program and is not likely to exercise management responsibility.

In a given CF, an elector may be either a candidate or a delegate, but never both.

The (competence field) management college

Each competence field has its governing body, which is a management college consisting of a number of representatives designated by the mechanisms described below. One of these representatives becomes the general secretary of the college. Members of a management college can be either candidate citizens or representatives sent by candidate structures.

The structure

In the DDD model, 'structures' are the equivalent of classic parties, lobbies, and generally all groups of citizens sharing interests, opinions, or simply wishing to exercise influence or power in the democratic model. A structure can therefore be based on a philosophical, geographical, economic, religious... identity.

A structure is specialized in one or more CC, and its organization is segmented according to them. The management and financing of a structure is organized according to its own rules. It is enough that it is directed in fact by known and identified voters.

The DDD model does not define or impose any other rules on the inner process of a structure. It does not impose any membership concept on a structure. There are voters who vote for a structure, plus possibly various roles defined within the structure, but which are not linked to the general DDD model.

There are two kinds of structures: delegate structures and candidate structures.

The delegate structure

The delegate structure does aim to directly exercise power, but rather to indirectly influence it, by collecting as many votes as possible.

A delegate structure issues votes in the CFs in which it is active. The delegate structures can act as a chain: a delegated structure can vote in favour of another delegate structure, in favour of a candidate structure, or in favour of a candidate citizen.

The candidate structure

The candidate structure aims to exercise power - by sending elected representatives (its delegates) to the CF management colleges in which it is active.

The candidate structure does not emit votes.

The mechanisms of choice of the potential elected delegates are rules internal to the candidate structure getting access to power. The same applies to the rules splitting the electoral weight between the different elected delegates.

The delegation database

The operational management of the DDD electoral system is organized around a database that is constantly updated. This database contains all the choices of the three categories of vote producers: simple electors, delegate citizens and delegate structures.

It is accessible online and permanently by all actors.

The DDD model at work

Voter actions

Any voter may act in the following ways.

Choices are made online. The elector connects frequently, rarely or never, according to his (her) personal choice. When a voter connects, (s)he identifies him(her)self in a secure way.

On the screen, he sees a list of competence fields (CF), and for each of them, he can consult and update his vote – his personal delegating choice.


In each competence field, his vote may be:*

Nothing (this is a form of abstention, which is equivalent to transferring this choice to all active electors)
  • A delegate citizen (his voice will then be a copy of the chosen delegate choice, and the voter thus expresses that his confidence and his vote will automatically be transferred where the trust and the vote of the chosen delegate will be directed)
  • A candidate citizen (the elector expresses his / her confidence in the chosen candidate and contributes to his / her opportunity to participate in the management college, and, where applicable, contributes to the collegial weight of the chosen candidate)
  • A delegate structure (its voice will then be a copy of the chosen delegate structure choice, and the voter thus expresses that his confidence and his vote will automatically be transferred where the trust and the vote of the chosen delegate structure will be directed)
  • A candidate structure (the elector expresses his / her confidence in the chosen candidate structure and contributes to its ability to participate in the management college, and, where appropriate, contributes to the collegial weight of the chosen candidate structure)


The voter may, as an option, declare himself a delegate or candidate (to the CF management college).

If he is a candidate, his vote is unnecessary, because he automatically goes to himself. Additionally, a voter can only be candidate in a single field of competence.

If he is a delegate, his vote can not be empty<ref name="ftn1">… and cannot be directed on anther delegate voting, directly or indirectly, for himself.</ref>.

Instead of a positive choice, the simple voter (one who is neither a delegate nor a candidate) can also have a negative vote on a candidate or a delegate, and in this case his voice will be subtracted from (instead of being added to). It is, of course, a way of expressing, not an adhesion, but a disapproval or an aversion.

If the voter has chosen several<ref name="ftn2">This multiple vote option is just accessory in the DDD model. </ref> citizens-candidates, the weight of his vote is divided by the number of persons chosen. These are then half-voices, third of voices, etc...

Delegate structure actions

For a delegate structure, the choices are quite similar, but more limited. A delegate may not vote for itself. It may vote for another structure (delegate or candidate) or for a candidate citizen. It can neither produce an empty vote nor vote for a delegate citizen.

However, where the single voter has a unit weight, a delegating has a total electoral weight equal to the number of votes delegated to it, and the delegate structure’s choice will be applied with this weight as a multiplicative factor.

Changes in election choices and electoral computation

The voter, the representative and the delegating can regularly update their choices, but to avoid too frequent variations in electoral weights, it is not allowed to modify a given choice, for a given competence field, too frequently, for example not more than once a month or once a quarter. This brake effect must prevent an excessive governance turnover, and guarantee a form of continuity. It is likely that the average time for a change of vote would actually be ten or hundred times longer than the minimum delay for the change.

Electoral weights

At the level of the database, simple and public algorithms propagate the votes of the voters towards the delegate citizens, the candidate citizens, the delegate structures and the candidate structures.

Ultimately, in each field of competence, there are candidate citizens who have obtained, directly or indirectly, some electoral weight, as well as candidate structures who have also obtained, directly or indirectly, some electoral weight.

All these figures are public.

The computation is continuously updated.

Competence Field Management College

The exercise of power - for each competence field - is ultimately attributed to a combination of candidate citizens and direct candidate structures. Together, these candidate citizens and candidate structures freely negotiate and agree to form a CF management college supported by a simple majority of the expressed votes, so a simple majority of the electoral weights.

Each member of the management college receives as attribute a personal weight. It's his collegial weight. This weight comes as a coefficient in the decision-making votes within the management college.

Candidate structures may send one or more of their members as representatives in the management college. These are the - elected - delegated representatives of the candidate structure. In this situation, the candidate structure gives to each of these delegated members a fictive electoral weight, so that these added fictive electoral weights are equal to the electoral weight of the candidate structure itself.

The collegiate weights of these delegated representatives is the proportion of their fictive electoral weights in relation to the sum of the electoral weights of all members of the college of management.

Similarly, for a candidate citizen present in a management college, his / her collegial weight is the proportion of his or her own electoral weight in relation to the sum of the electoral weights of all members of the management college.

Each management college appoints among his members a general secretary who has a coordination and communication function. He is designated by negotiation, and by default, the member with the highest collegial weight is designated.

When a change in electoral weight occurs and withdraws the majority from the college of management, the college and the other candidates negotiate to reconstitute a new majority, by adding new members and / or possibly removing existing members. Until this objective is reached, no valid decision can be taken by the management college.

Decisions taken by the management college are taken by a majority of 60% (adjustable parameter), each member weighing in the count according to his collegiate weight.

Multiple mandates rules

The general concepts of DDD:* Promotes transparency of powers

  • Discourages the forms of cumulation that may lead to conflicts of interest or concentrations of power
  • Promotes mechanisms that allow fluidity in democratic representations and decision-making processes


The main rules for allowed and prohibited mandate combinations are summarized below (rather ‘natural’ rules, however subject to wide discussions):* It is forbidden for a citizen to be a candidate in more than one CF.

  • It is forbidden for a citizen to be active (delegate or candidate) in more than three CFs.
  • A citizen cannot be both candidate and representative in any CF.
  • It is allowed to be simultaneously administrator of a structure and active citizen.
  • It is forbidden to be the main administrator of one structure and administrator of another structure.
  • It is forbidden to be the main administrator of a candidate structure and representative delegated by this candidate structure.
  • It is allowed to be a simple administrator of several structures.
  • It is forbidden to exercise responsibilities in more than one management college, therefore to be delegated representative more than once.


Transparency of the database

In the DDD database, the voter’s choices can be made public or not according to his/her individual preference, and this choice can be made independently for each CF.

The question of the secret or public nature of the vote is very interesting. Why do we ask for transparency from the elected representatives, and at the same time allow the secret opacity to the voters? If it is a matter of avoiding unhealthy pressures, is this precaution still valid for the great democracies of today involving tens of millions of voters? The author advocates for full transparency, but it is not a vital component of the DDD model.


On the other hand, the choices of delegate structures have to be completely public. And if a voter refuses to make his/her choice public in any competence field, then in all competence fields he loses the opportunity to represent other voters by any delegation mechanism: he loses the opportunity to be a representative or candidate, and he loses the possibility of being a director of a structure, or being representative of a candidate structure.

The spirit of this rule is to force the transparent behaviour of all actors who wish to play an active role in democracy.

The names of the candidates, their electoral weights, the names of the delegates, their electoral weights, all this information is continuously accessible to all kind of actors in the democratic game.

Special competence fields

Supervision

Some matters are related not to one, but to multiple competence fields.

On such matters, as well as on those which are under a higher authority or which require arbitration between competence fields which might be in disagreement, it is a special field of competence which operated ultimately, the supervision competence field.

The latter may, if it is the only solution, take a decision on its own initiative. However, it must preferably act as arbitrator by deciding which competence field(s) is in charge of all or part of the cases submitted to his arbitration. This competence field is, in a sense, a supreme arbitration authority.

The operational functioning of the database, its transparency and its technical components are the responsibility of the supervision competence field.

If it were necessary to designate the individual with the ultimate responsibility in the DDD structures, it would be the general secretary of the supervisory field. But this responsibility is only activated when others fail to efficiently produce decisions.

Legislation

In the DDD model, there is no classic distinction between legislative and executive power. Instead, it should be considered within the DDD that all competence fields are executive, with the exception of one whose sole responsibility is the legislative production. This legislative competence field is not exposed to supervision, nor to any other competence field. Its mode of operation may be specific and organized in layers. Inside the legislation competence field, there may separation between the mechanism of production of laws, and the mechanism of promulgation of them.

The rules of operation of the legislation field are thus quite specific, not directly linked to the DDD model principles. They are not reviewed here.

Justice

The management of justice in the DDD model is similar to that of legislation. It is under the authority of a dedicated competence field.

The separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary fields is thus achieved by means of a separation of competence fields. This separation may be reinforced by specific provisions, stating that delegates and representatives active in the legislative sphere or in the sphere of jurisdiction can not be involved in any other competence field.

Summary comparison table

Classic democracy DDD Democracy
Cyclical elections Continuous delegation
Power cycles. Cyclical exercise of power. Fuzzy pre-election and post-election times. Cyclical election promises Power continuity. Progressive changes only at times desired by the citizens, not at predefined election dates.
Weak transparency Strong transparency
Laborious legal frames poorly respected, inefficient investigative committees. Transparency provided by the (web) visibility of democratic transmission channels, completely and permanently.
Particracy Delegating structures
Power structures without intermediary level, directly soliciting the voter, who only has a theoretical access to those structures. Recursive process between the citizen voter and structures at various levels with various sizes and weights.
Competence fields
Powers in competence fields are distributed as a result of party negotiations, with low or null consideration for actual experience or expertise. Powers in competence fields are distributed through democratic transmission channels, one for each competence field. The continuity of power is specific and independent for any competence field.
Technology
Technology only used to implement an election process defined centuries ago. Technology serves the transparency of the continuous and dynamic representation of the voter citizen.
Minimal voter action
Cyclical choices between numerous parties and numerous individuals, often poorly known. Delegation to a trusted individual (delegate) or to a trusted group (delegate structure). May be updated at any time.


Comments and discussions

The human and the system

Criticisms against democracies often focus to individual power men: presidents, ministers and others.

But the DDD process does not imply any form of individual criticism. The challenge target, which is expected to replaced or renewed, is the democratic representation system and its institutions. Individuals and parties are not criticized. Both may play an active role in a DDD democracy, as delegates, delegate structure or member of a field management college.

The DDD representation model implies a redistribution of powers by promoting a strong form of transparency. By doing that, it challenges the system, neither the man nor the men.

DDD : right-wing or left-wing ?

Should the DDD project be considered as a conservative (“republican”) or socialist (“labour” “democrat”) concept ?

Actually the DDD approach is by no means linked to the left/right cleavage<ref name="ftn3">Actually the writer, for several reasons (readable elsewhere, in the M3M model) claims neither a right-wing vision nor a left-wing vision, both of which appear in his vision inadequate to the human nature. </ref>.

But if transparency is a democratic feature more linked to the socialist vision – which is yet to be proven – then maybe the DDD project is more in line with this pole.

Secret or public voting ?

The democratic tradition underlines the importance of secrecy regarding the voting process. But at the same time, transparency in the exercise of power has always been a legitimate request from the voters, and from some representatives.

This contradiction is absent in the DDD model, who clearly defends a maximal and global transparency at all levels, suggesting it at least, imposing it as much as possible for all active players of the democratic game. It is the price to pay for those who want structures less prone to corruption and hidden objectives.

DDD and corruption

There are in various democracies of the world quite diverse forms of corruption or electoral malfeasance. In some countries, voters' voices are bought, and so power is 'democratically' bought by the richest. This is the corruption of the voter by the representative.

This is obviously a condemnable drift of democracy. Does the DDD model have a positive or negative influence on this?

In any case, it can not respond completely and effectively to that. It seems inevitable that in any system, the money is led to play a role that favours the one who holds it.

But by eliminating electoral cycles on the one hand, by pushing as much transparency as possible from the chain of delegation of power on the other hand, the DDD model would help to fight and reduce at least this kind of corruption.

Geographical extension and granularity

The DDD model can be applied at different scales: sub-national (regional), national and supranational. The mechanisms described are valid in all cases. Practically the voters would have sets of choice for each of the geographical entities in which they are included.

On various topics (such as the environment), the chains of delegation should obviously lead to effective and transnational management colleges.

The DDD transition

If success ever occurs for the DDD approach, if in a region or a country, the desire emerges to set up of its modalities, how would the change from classical democracy to DDD-based democracy take place ? Should it involve a form of revolution, a confrontation?

No, it is possible to organize a smooth transition, with successive adaptations and possible adjustment steps. To achieve this, the following action would be undertaken : # Create a 'classic' party called 'DDD transition' (for example). This party is intended to be transitory and will disappear if and when it meets its objectives.

  1. Technical implementation of the DDD database and the applications giving access to it.
  2. Access to DDD applications<ref name="ftn4">Welcome to software developers and testers interested in participating to this... </ref> given to electors in simulation mode (web site DDDsimul.gonze.org). In this simulation space, the delegate citizens, the delegate structures and the candidate structures would define themselves autonomously and spontaneously. The DDD arithmetic turns effective and its results are displayed. Everything is transparent. The classic political parties clone themselves into candidate structures. Lobbies and pressure groups clone themselves into delegate structures.
  3. Fully functional DDD democracy in simulation mode in parallel with classical democracy. Emergence of management colleges as part of the simulation process.
  4. Switch from simulation mode to operational mode by decree or constitutional reform.


These steps are aimed at gradually familiarizing the voters and the various democratic participants with the concrete use of the DDD interface.

Conclusion

The DDD model is presented here as a more flexible and equilibrated form of democratic representation, enabled by the technological potential of our time.

It is not the intention of the author to present it as a definitive or rigid solution.

Its essential mission is to underline and to circumvent the obvious paralyzing weaknesses of the present democracies. It is up to the reader to judge the extent to which the DDD model is less exposed to theses weaknesses of democracy listed above.

And regarding the ways to run of the DDD model, or regarding its constitutional and legal support, numerous variants deserve attention. May this text nourish a necessary and fruitful debate!

Support

The reader convinced by this text is invited to express his/her adhesion at various levels on the web page DDD.gonze.org, in the support section.

Additional and complementary issues

Three main questioning issues may be linked to the DDD approach and are dealt with in the M3M texts.

The first is related to the concept of enterprise. Enterprises are responsible for covering several basic needs of the population, but they are mainly serving the financial interests of their shareholders.

The second relates to the role of work, which is no longer perceived for its object (the result of work, its output) but rather for its subject (the worker and his social status). This biased perception biases in turn the debates on employment and unemployment, productivity and solidarity.

Nations and frontiers are a miserable invention of the human race. They nourish deadly identities, conflicts and wars.

There are some links between these questioning issues and the creation of the DDD model. This articulation is analysed elsewhere, in the M3M global document.