DDD.EN
This text is dedicated and intended to my children, their children, and to all present and future human children.
DDD: Meaning and context
DDD is an acronym for « Democracy by Digital Delegation » which could equally be termed "Democracy by Continuous Digital Delegation", or simply "Democracy 2.0".
As the name implies, this is a proposal for the development and renewal of the model for democratic representation.
This development is of a digital nature, in the sense that information and telecommunication technologies play an important and innovative role.
It operates primarily through a system of delegation that differs from the current electoral systems.
This delegation is ongoing and continually updated, while current systems are typically cyclical.
This text is organized in two parts. The first part summarizes the weaknesses of western democracies, suggesting that these weaknesses might be treated or cured. The second part describes the main components of the DDD democratic model.
The weaknesses of Western democracies
In Europe, America and throughout the entire world, the democratic model is ailing: voters feel misunderstood, they no longer care about exercising the right to vote, though this right was so hard-won by their predecessors. Those invested with power, the political class and the elected officials, now incite the distrust and suspicion of those who have chosen them. Whether or not these suspicions are justified, voters no longer feel correctly represented in the numerous and complex institutions generated by the increasingly tortuous and contradictory machinery of democratic structures.
The old democratic principle, namely the dignified and balanced representation of the voter, has been lost somewhere in the successive improvements of history. It is now time to take a critical look at it, and build something new, preserving the vital force of the principle of democracy, while at the same time incorporating new mechanisms more suitable for the biotope of contemporary man.
Many authors and journalists have highlighted the limits and weaknesses of the democratic machinery. Here are summarised the most significant ones, which serve as a contrast to the proposals of the DDD.
Strange success criteria for elected representatives
Electoral campaigns involve candidates whose aim is to obtain a maximum number of votes. As a consequence, the elegance, the presence, the sense of distribution and the effectiveness of the media have a greater impact than the ambition or the clarity of the programs presented. These come down to well-chosen slogans, often developed by communication consultants whose performance will be paid, not according to the quality of the program and the themes presented, but according to the number of votes obtained. As for the candidates themselves, the success criteria afore mentioned - political presence, media effectiveness and others - will serve to promote and favour likeable and popular personalities, people in entertainment and communication, such as journalists, actors, and charismatic business men. We cannot systematically deny the human attributes, ideals and management qualities of these profiles. Yet, given the challenges faced by elected officials, it is clear that these profiles are not a priori the best-equipped to deal with these problems, compared to various specialists in the technical, political or scientific spheres. Sadly, the latter rarely prioritize the techniques of electoral communications, or show any inclination for these activities.
Democratic cycles are sources of dysfunction
The same naively repeated, depressing cycles are observed in all democracies.
During electoral periods – when mandates are expiring and renewing – the existing elected representatives behave in the same way as their competitors, so eager to take their place. It is a period of promises in every direction. Glorious results claimed by those who have been in power, deplorable results reported by those who want to take over. During this election period, candidates are depicted with enthusiasm by their supporters, with disdain by their competitors, and objectivity gives way completely to the media circus. One of the consequences of these exercises is that during this period, the elected officials no longer worry about running the country, but rather about presenting an optimal balance sheet enhanced with promises which appeal to current tastes.
During the mandate period, the elected representative is gradually forced to retreat, faced with over optimistic promises that he had resorted to in order to gain votes. Inevitably, or at least in the vast majority of cases, the popularity of an elected official is progressively weaker than it was at the start of his campaign. The management of issues is, in fact, skewed and unhealthy. This distortion between promises and constraints implies a management in delicate balance. It is also during the mandate that elected officials can reap unpublicised benefits from their power, more or less legitimately. It is the moment to return favours, to do the inventory of debits and credits between representatives and those who gave them their support, and to search for the best returns on electoral investments. If some are indeed unquestionably honest and devoted political staff - but how did they get there in the first place? - It should also be noted that others, who are less scrupulous, know how to take advantage of the money invested in election campaigns. The former want and can deal with problems in the interest of the citizen, but the latter want and can deal with the same problems but in the interest of their party, their friends and themselves.
Moreover, democratic cycles often result in the alternation of individuals and parties in power. Most often, the end of one mandate and the beginning of the next involves the putting on hold of programs that had been slowly put in place by the predecessors, and a gradual up-take of information by the successors. This results in long periods of wavering and management failure, either because the knowledge is lacking to finish the program, or because the programs are not fully constructed or solidly supported by information. In either case, the potential management qualities of the predecessors or the successors do not carry much weight when faced with the implacable logic of democratic cycles.
It is not in the interest of elected representatives to tackle real problems
Why should an elected representative bravely tackle the most delicate problems asked of him?
It has been shown that if the best solution to a problem involves unpopular measures which are unlikely to retain, or, even to drain votes in the future, then it is in every interest of an elected official not to solve it. It is better for him/her to take temporary, popular and, preferably, those measures with strong media impact, rather than to address a problem at its source. Putting off the difficult decisions, passing the delicate and unpopular requirement to handle them better over to others, is the most profitable political choice. This is a time orientated process: NIMTO (not in my term of office). The same logic exists for the field of competence: NIMBY (not in my back yard). In other words, no politician wants a difficult problem to encumber his field of competence.
Limits of particracy
Particracy allows individuals sharing similar opinions to group together and thereby gain more representative strength. In itself, it is a commendable principle, and a quite natural extension of human nature.
However, particracy leads to various suspicious and reprehensible drifting. The individual voter often feels more affinity with a wing of a party rather than with the party in its globality, or even with an individual or group of individuals within that party. Moreover, parties are debatable fields of negotiation and effective distributions of power, where voters and their interests are not represented or defended in a transparent way. Finally, relations between political parties and financial powers are often compromising and opaque, inciting compromise and even corruption. Mechanisms for party funding are often investigated, and it can be assumed that those not being investigated are simply those that have been organized in a more discreet manner.
Citizen is kept too distant from power
Often forced to choose between parties and people he does not know and over whom he has no control, the citizen does not recognize himself in the choices he is called upon to make, and therefore he does not care. He thus loses confidence, not only in the parties and elected officials in power, but moreover, in the method of democratic representation presented to him.
Non-specialization of elected representatives and leaders
This is a generic effect of democratic mechanisms, but one which is amplified by particracy. Leadership positions, corresponding to more or less broad fields of competence, are distributed between elected representatives, either directly or indirectly, through negotiations between ruling parties, and even more so, from within the parties themselves. But in the vast majority of cases, the leaders in place and a portion of their teams have no expertise, or any particular competence. Their electoral and political successes give them the right to exert their authority in the most diverse fields: health, environment, education, finance, justice, international relations, etc. It is as if none of these areas require any specific knowledge, as if electoral competence was universally applicable and transposable.
At the same time, the voter, who puts his trust in an individual or a party for certain areas of competence, is obliged to choose the same individual, or the same party for all areas of competence. What should someone choose who thinks that while a party's fiscal program is vital, its approach to education is deplorable?
Difficult representation of minorities
Minorities consider themselves as poorly represented in the great democratic states and, in fact, they often are. Large entities of population and economic power, such as Greece (towards the EU), Scotland (towards Great Britain), Great Britain (towards the EU), Catalonia (towards Spain), California (towards the USA) consider their identities as badly or completely unrepresented, and wish for - and sometimes obtain - forms of secession, though this secession is a distressing prospect for many members of both the super and the sub-entity. And of course, in all parts of the world, smaller entities often experience similar situations much more dramatically.
Ethnic, religious or cultural minorities live with similar problems, even if they do not have a defined geographical anchorage. These entities exist and are often represented by influential or pressure groups, yet they often find themselves ineffectively represented within the democratic machinery, often perceived as unjust.
Moreover, each of us possesses a mixture of multiple identities, and it would be absurd to try to force a person to define himself by a single identity, or by a single party.
Existing democracies respect neither the identities of the minority groups they are supposed to protect, nor the multiple identities of the individuals who make up these democracies.
When people say 'NO!' to democracy
Beginning in 2016, the rejection of the democratic model clearly manifested itself in the major events of global political life.
In June 2016, Britain's choice of Brexit expressed a rejection of the European construction by one of its most significant players, widely opening the way to Euro-scepticism in each of its member states.
In the Republican primaries of the United States, and, more importantly, in the November 2016 presidential elections, the political class of the world's first power received a major slap in the face, as the people expressed themselves in favour of a billionaire who was notoriously ignorant of politics and diplomacy. The voter preferred a narcissistic and megalomaniac clown to lead him down dangerous paths, to the great democratic and republican figures. One hundred days after the start of the presidential term, this new champion of democracy has beaten a new record of unpopularity.
In France, May 2017, the presidential elections brought together four candidates, each one in turn receiving more obstruction, protest and denigration, than support. In the second round, the main messages expressed the 'need to block ...’. The president was not able to convince 25% of voters in the first round, and he began his mandate with more opponents than supporters.
In all three cases, the themes of identity retrenchment were the most widely claimed, a far cry from the humanist ideals which are supposed to nourish the democratic processes.
In addition, in all three cases, the dominant message was a huge NO. No to the political class in general, no to the 'democratic' supranational (European) construction, no to the major players of the political landscapes.
Finally, in all three cases, the weaknesses of the democracies mentioned above have been clearly emphasized and demonstrated.
Citizen Manifesto
Here, indirectly stated, are the general principles of the DDD. It is therefore, both a response to the ailments described above, and a form of specification.
We, the voters, aspire to a model of representation that is more democratic, more accessible, more flexible and more suited to our times. In particular:* We want to be able to direct our votes in different fields of competence in an independent manner.
- We want to be able to redirect our votes when we want, and not only when election cycles allow for it, or impose it on us. We no longer want to be prisoners of electoral cycle promises, too frequently followed by repudiations.
- We want to escape the party system which has become too distant from us. We would prefer to give our votes to citizens or structures closer to us, with the possibility of transferring our electoral weighting to them if they do not have or do not operate any direct responsibilities.
- We want, in line with our own personal skills - within the corresponding fields of competence – the possibility for each of us to become the electoral delegate for others who place their trust in us.
- We want to benefit from the flexibility, proximity and interactivity of web applications when exercising our right to vote.
General principles of the DDD model
In order to respond to the expectations expressed by the citizen in the manifesto above, the DDD model must be in contrast to the standard democratic model:* The exercise of democracy should not be cyclical, but rather an ongoing process.
- There should be voters, candidates, representatives, but not an election event.
- The parties, lobbies and pressure groups should be replaced by more numerous and more flexible structures.
- Fields of competence (FC) should define and serve as well-segmented territories of the democratic exercise of power.
Actors in the DDD model
The voter
As in the classic democratic model, the voter makes his choices through his vote. It is structured differently however. It may be very simple or relatively complex, but the general democratic principle remains applicable: the elected representatives are ultimately appointed by him, the elector, and his peers.
The candidate
Any voter may declare himself (herself) a candidate in a given field of competence. If this is the case, it is his responsibility to publicize his program, as well as his own choices and convictions. He is likely to form part of an executive branch within a management college.
The elected representative
The candidate can become an elected representative, exercising active responsibilities within a FC management college.
The delegate
Any voter may declare himself a delegate in a given FC. This means that other voters can place their trust in him and align themselves to his voting choices. This is one of the mechanisms of delegation. The delegate does not necessarily have to publish a program and is not likely to exercise management responsibility.
In a given FC, a voter may be either a candidate or a delegate, but never both.
The (field of competence) management college
Each field of competence has its own governing body, which is a management college consisting of a number of representatives specified by the mechanisms described below. One of these representatives becomes the general secretary of the college. Members of a management college can be either candidates or representatives sent by candidate structures.
The structure
In the DDD model, the 'structures' are the equivalent of the traditional parties, lobbies, and generally all groups of citizens sharing interests, opinions, or simply wishing to exercise influence or power in the democratic model. A structure can therefore be based on a philosophical, geographical, economic, religious... identity.
A structure is specialized in one or more FC, and its organization is segmented according to them. The management and financing of a structure is organized according to its own rules. It is enough that it is directed by known and identified voters.
The DDD model does not define nor impose any other rules on the inner process of a structure. It does not impose any membership concept on a structure. There are some voters who vote for a structure, plus possibly various roles defined within the structure, but which are not linked to the general DDD model.
There are two kinds of structures: delegate structures and candidate structures.
The delegate structure
The delegate structure does not aim to directly exercise power, but rather to indirectly influence it by collecting as many votes as possible.
A delegate structure issues votes in the CFs in which it is active. The delegate structures can act as a chain: a delegated structure can vote in favour of another delegate structure, a candidate structure, or in favour of a candidate.
The candidate structure
The candidate structure aims to exercise power - by sending elected representatives (its delegates) to the FC management colleges in which it is active.
The candidate structure does not issue votes.
The choice mechanisms of the potential elected delegates pertain to rules internal to the candidate structure accessing power. The same applies to the rules splitting the electoral weighting between the different elected delegates.
The delegation database
The operational management of the DDD electoral system is organized around a database that is constantly updated. This database contains all the votes of the three categories of vote producers: basic voters, delegates and delegate structures.
This data base is permanently accessible online by all participants.
The DDD model at work
The actions of the voter
The voter may perform any of the following actions.
Choices are made online. The voter connects frequently, rarely or never, according to his/her personal choice. When a voter connects, he/she identifies himself/herself in a secure way.
On the screen, he sees a list of the fields of competence (FC), and for each of them, he can consult and update his vote – his personal delegating choice.
In each field of competence, the vote may be:*
- A delegate (the vote will then be along the same lines as the chosen delegate, and in this way, the voter expresses that his confidence and his vote will automatically be directed to the chosen delegate)
- A candidate (the voter expresses his/her confidence in the chosen candidate and contributes to his/her ability to participate in the management college, and, where appropriate, contributes to the collegial weighting of the chosen candidate)
- A delegate structure (its vote will then be in line with the structure of the chosen delegate, and in this way the voter expresses that his confidence and vote will automatically be transferred to that of the delegate structure chosen)
- A candidate structure (the voter expresses his/her confidence in the chosen candidate structure and contributes to its ability to participate in the management college, and, where appropriate, contributes to the collegial weighting of the chosen candidate structure)
The voter may, as an option, declare himself a delegate or candidate (for the FC management college).
If he is a candidate, his vote is unnecessary, as it already applies. Additionally, a voter can only be a candidate in a single field of competence.
If he is a delegate, his vote cannot be blank<ref name="ftn1">… and cannot be transferred, directly or indirectly, to another voting delegate.</ref>.
Instead of a positive choice, the basic voter (one who is neither a delegate nor a candidate) can also transfer a negative vote to a candidate or a delegate, and in this case his vote will be subtracted (rather than added). It is, of course, a way of expressing a disapproval or an aversion rather than a positive support.
If the voter has chosen several<ref name="ftn2">This option for a divided vote is an accessory in the DDD model.</ref> candidates, the weighting of his vote is divided by the number of people chosen. These are then half-votes, third-votes, etc...
Delegate structure actions
For a delegate structure, the choices are quite similar, but more limited. The delegate structure cannot vote for itself. It may vote for another (delegate or candidate) structure or for a candidate. Neither can it produce a blank vote nor vote for a delegate.
However, where the basic voter has a unit weighting, a delegating structure has a total electoral weighting equal to the number of votes delegated to it, and the delegate structure’s choice will be applied with this weighting as a multiplicative factor.
Changes in election choices and electoral computation
The basic voter, the delegate and the delegate structure can regularly redirect their votes. However, in order to avoid too frequent variations in electoral weightings, modifying too frequently a given vote for a given competence field is not permitted. For example, this should not be done more than once a month or once a quarter. This braking effect should prevent an excessive turnover of governance, and guarantee a form of continuity. It is likely that the average time period for a change of vote would actually be ten or one hundred times longer than the minimum time period imposed for this changeover.
Electoral weightings
At the database level, simple and public algorithms spread the votes across the delegates, the candidates, the delegate structures and the candidate structures.
Ultimately, in each field of competence, there are candidates who have obtained, directly or indirectly, some electoral weighting, as well as candidate structures who have also obtained, directly or indirectly, some electoral weighting.
All these figures are public.
The computation is continuously updated.
Field of Competence Management College
The exercise of power - for each field of competence - is ultimately attributed to a combination of candidates and candidate structures. Together, these candidates and candidate structures freely negotiate and agree to form a FC management college supported by a simple majority of the votes expressed, therefore a simple majority of the electoral weightings.
Each member of the management college receives a personal weighting. It is his collegial weighting. This weighting operates as a coefficient in the decision-making votes within the management college.
Candidate structures can delegate one or more of their representatives to the management college. These representatives are the - electives - of the candidate structure. In this situation, the candidate structure gives each of these delegated representatives a fictive electoral weighting. When added together, these fictive electoral weightings are equal to the electoral weighting of the candidate structure itself.
The collegiate weightings of these candidate structure representatives are defined as the proportion of their fictive electoral weightings in relation to the sum of the electoral weightings of all members of the college of management.
Similarly, for an elected candidate present in a management college, his/her collegial weighting is the proportion of his/her own electoral weighting in relation to the sum of the electoral weightings of all members of the management college.
From within, each management college appoints a general secretary with a coordination and communication function. This appointment is achieved through negotiation, and, by default, the member with the highest collegial weighting is appointed.
When a change in electoral weighting occurs and withdraws the majority from the college of management, the college and the other candidates negotiate to reconstitute a new majority, by adding new members and/or possibly removing existing members. Until this objective is reached, no valid decision can be taken by the management college.
Decisions taken by the management college are taken by a majority of 60% (adjustable parameter), each member weighing in the count according to his collegiate weighting.
Rules for multiple mandates
The general concepts of the DDD:* Promotes the transparency of power
- Discourages forms of cumulation that may lead to conflicts of interest or concentrations of power
- Promotes mechanisms that allow fluidity in democratic representations and decision-making processes
The main rules for permitted and prohibited mandate combinations are summarized below (these rather ‘natural’ rules, are, however, subject to discussion):* It is forbidden for a citizen to be a candidate in more than one FC.
- It is forbidden for a citizen to be active (delegate or candidate) in more than three FCs.
- A citizen cannot be both a candidate and a representative in a given FC.
- It is permitted to be an administrator of a structure and an active citizen simultaneously.
- It is forbidden to be the main administrator of one structure and an administrator of another structure.
- It is forbidden to be both the main administrator of a structure and a representative of it.
- It is permitted to be an administrator of several structures.
- It is forbidden to exercise responsibilities of representation in more than one management college, and thus to be a delegate more than once.
Transparency of the database
In the DDD database, the voter’s choices can be made public or not according to his/her individual preference. This choice can be made independently for each field of competence.
On the other hand, the choices of delegate structures have to be entirely public. And if a voter refuses to make his/her choice public in any field of competence, then he loses the opportunity to represent other voters in all fields of competence through the delegation mechanism: he loses the opportunity to be a representative or candidate, and he loses the possibility of being a director of a structure, or representing a candidate structure.
The spirit of this rule, is to ensure that all participants who wish to play an active role in democracy behave in a transparent manner.
The names of the candidates, their electoral weighting, the names of the delegates, their electoral weighting, all this information is continuously accessible to every player in the democratic game.
Special fields of competence
Supervision
Some matters are related not to one, but to multiple fields of competence.
For such matters, as well as for those which are under a higher authority or which require arbitration between fields of competence in disagreement, there is a special field of competence which acts as the ultimate arbitrator: the supervisory field of competence.
The latter may, if it is the only solution, take a decision on its own initiative. However, it should preferably act as arbitrator by deciding which field(s) of competence is in charge of all, or part, of the cases submitted to arbitration. This field of competence is, in a sense, a supreme arbitration authority.
The operational functioning of the database, its transparency and its technical components, are the responsibility of the supervisory field of competence.
If it were necessary to allocate an individual with ultimate responsibility in the DDD structures, this would be the general secretary of the supervisory field. However, this responsibility would only be activated if others failed to make decisions effectively between them.
Legislation
In the DDD model, there is no classic distinction between legislative and executive power. Instead, it should be considered that within the DDD all fields of competence are executive, with the exception of one whose sole responsibility is the production of legislation. This field of competence is not subject to the supervisory field, nor to any other. Its mode of operation may be specific and tiered. Within it, the drafting of laws may be separate from the enacting of them.
For the field of legislation, the rules of operation are thus quite specific, and not directly linked to the principles of the DDD model. They are not reviewed here.
Justice
The management of justice in the DDD model is similar to that of legislation. It is under the authority of a dedicated field of competence.
The separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary fields is thus achieved by means of a separation of the fields of competence. This separation may be reinforced by specific provisions, stating that delegates and representatives active in the legislative sphere, or in the sphere of jurisdiction, cannot be involved in any other field of competence.
Summary comparison table
| Classic democracy | DDD Democracy |
|---|---|
| Cyclical elections | Continuous delegation |
| Cycles of power. Cyclical exercise of power. Vague pre-election and post-election periods. Cyclical election promises | Continuity of power. Progressive changes at times desired by the citizens, and not at predefined election dates. |
| Weak transparency | Strong transparency |
| Laborious legal frameworks which are poorly respected, inefficient investigative committees. | Transparency is assured by the complete and permanent (web) visibility through democratic channels. |
| Particracy | Delegate structures and candidates |
| Power structures without intermediation, directly soliciting the voter, who only has a theoretical access to those structures. | Recursive arrangement between the voter and structures of progressive size and weight. |
| Fields of competence | |
| Attribution of power in fields of competence as a result of party negotiations, with little or no consideration for actual experience or expertise. | Attribution of power in fields of competence through distinctive democratic channels. The continuity of power is specific and independent for each competence field. |
| Technology | |
| Technology modelled on an election process defined centuries ago. | Technology serves to enhance transparency and to continually and dynamically represent the voter. |
| Minimal action for the voter | |
| Cyclical choices between numerous parties and individuals, about which, often, little is known. | Delegation to a trusted individual (delegate) or to a trusted group (delegate structure). May be updated at any time.
|
Comments and discussions
Man and the system
Criticisms against democracies often focus on individual people in power: presidents, ministers and others.
However, the DDD approach does not imply any form of criticism against individuals. It is the system of democratic representation and its institutions which is being challenged. It is their renewal and replacement that is being called for. Individuals and parties are not being held up for criticism. Both may play an active role in a DDD democracy, as delegates, delegate structures or members of a field management college.
The DDD democratic representation model argues for a redistribution of power through a strong form of transparency. In so doing, it challenges the system, not the individual or the party.
DDD: right-wing or left-wing?
Should the DDD approach be considered as a Conservative (“Republican”) or Socialist (“Labour” “Democrat”) concept?
Indeed, the DDD approach is by no means linked to the left/right division<ref name="ftn3">Indeed the writer, for several reasons (expressed elsewhere, in the M3M model) claims neither a right-wing nor a left-wing vision, both of which appear, in his eyes, inadequate.</ref>.
But if transparency is a democratic feature more linked to the socialist vision – which is yet to be proven – then maybe the DDD project is more in line with this.
Secret or public voting?
The democratic tradition gives great importance to the secret nature of the voting process. But at the same time, transparency in the exercise of power has always been a legitimate request from the voters, and from some representatives.
This contradiction is absent from the DDD model, which clearly defends a maximal and global transparency at all levels, suggesting it at the very least, demanding it as much as possible from all active players of the democratic game. It is the price to pay for those who want structures less prone to corruption and hidden objectives.
DDD and corruption
In the various democracies of the world, there are quite diverse forms of corruption or electoral malpractice. In some countries, votes are bought, and thus power is 'democratically' bought by the richest. This is the corruption of the voter by the representative.
This is clearly a harmful and condemnable deviation of democracy. Does the DDD model have a positive or negative influence on this?
It cannot respond completely and effectively to this. It seems inevitable that in any system, money plays a role that favours the one who holds it.
However, by eliminating electoral cycles on the one hand, by pushing for as much transparency as possible from the delegation of power chain on the other, the DDD model would help to fight and reduce this kind of corruption.
Geographical extension and granularity
The DDD model can be applied at different scales: sub-national (regional), national and supranational. The mechanisms described are valid in all cases. In practice, the voters would have sets of choice for each of the geographical entities in which they are included.
On diverse subjects (such as the environment), the chains of delegation should obviously lead to effective and transnational management colleges.
The DDD transition
If the DDD approach is ever successful, if there is a desire to implement its modalities in a particular region or country, how would the change from traditional democracy to a DDD-based democracy take place? Should it involve a form of revolution or confrontation?
No. It is quite possible to organize a smooth transition, with successive adaptations and adjustments. In order to achieve this, the following actions would be undertaken:# The creation of a 'classic' party called 'DDD transition' (for example). This party is intended to be a transitional one and will disappear if and when it meets its objectives.
- The technical implementation of the DDD database and the applications giving access to it.
- Access to DDD applications<ref name="ftn4">Welcome to any software developers and testers interested in participating in this...</ref> given to voters in simulation mode (web site DDDsimul.gonze.org, under development). In this simulation space, the delegates, candidates, delegate structures and the candidate structures would define themselves autonomously and spontaneously. The DDD arithmetic comes into play and its results are displayed. Everything is transparent. The classical political parties clone themselves into candidate structures. Lobbies and pressure groups clone themselves into delegate structures.
- Fully functional DDD democracy in simulation mode in parallel with classical democracy. Emergence of management colleges as part of the simulation process.
- A switch from simulation mode to operational mode by decree or constitutional reform.
These steps are aimed at gradually familiarizing the voters and the various democratic participants with the specific usage of the DDD interface.
Conclusion
The DDD model is presented here as a more flexible and just form of democratic representation, enabled by the technological potential of our time.
It is not the intention of the author to present it as a definitive or rigid solution.
Its core mission is to underline and circumvent the obvious and paralysing weaknesses of present democracies. It is up to the reader to judge the extent to which the DDD model would be less exposed to these weaknesses of democracy listed above.
Regarding the functioning of the DDD model, or its constitutional and legal support, numerous variants deserve attention. May this text nourish a much needed and fruitful debate!
Demo
All ideas exposed in this document may be checked and tested in an interactive simulation web application, at the address DDDSimul.gonze.org .
Support
The reader convinced by this text is invited to express his/her support in various ways on the web page DDD.gonze.org, in the support section.
Additional and complementary issues
Three main question areas may be linked to the DDD approach and are dealt with in the M3M texts.
The first is related to the concept of enterprise. Businesses are responsible for covering several basic needs of the population, but they are mainly serving the financial interests of their shareholders.
The second relates to the role of work, which is no longer perceived for its object (the result of the work, its output) but rather for its subject (the worker and his social status). This biased perception biases in turn the debates on employment and unemployment, productivity and solidarity.
Nations and borders are a miserable invention of the human race. They feed murderous identities, conflicts and wars.
There are some links between these question areas and the creation of the DDD model. This articulation is analysed elsewhere, in the M3M global document.